Derivas Analíticas Journal - Nº 20 - March 2024. ISSN:2526-2637
Boys and girls are not (yet) men and women[1]
Sérgio Laia
Psychoanalyst
Analyst Member of the School (AME)
at the Brazilian School of Psychoanalysis (EBP)
and the World Association of Psychoanalysis (WAP)
General Director of EBP-MG
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A poem seemed to me opportune to introduce the theme I intend to address here. The theme, concerning what Lacan (1972-73/1985) named “sexuation”, has to do with the difference with which adolescents will be especially confronted (not without difficulties that are very specific to them) in this transition that takes their bodies between childhood and so-called “adult life”. Referring, in turn, to what moves away and yet permeates the gaze, a poem by Ana Martins Marques (2009, p. 64), entitled Iceberg, says:
Our childhood separated from us
Like an iceberg
we saw it drift slowly away
the blind glare of the ice against the sun
and everything they say is underneath
A well-known metaphor, attributed to Freud, says that consciousness is just the tip of an iceberg, the unconscious is the huge part of that mountain of ice which remains submerged. However, we do not actually find Freud's signature on this metaphor and, in fact, it only appears in chapter 8 of the first volume of the biography dedicated to him by Jones (1963). In this chapter, it is Fechner (and not Freud), who is presented as having “related the mind to an iceberg that is nine-tenths under water and whose course is determined not only by the wind that strikes the surface, but also by the currents of the depths.” ” (JONES, 1963); specifically about Freud, in this context, it is only highlighted how many of Fechner's ideas served as references to him.
It seems, therefore, that this attribution of the iceberg metaphor to Freud suits the misunderstandings propagated throughout history and, possibly, the important place of the biography written by Jones in the dissemination of psychoanalysis. Still, this attribution, even though I can now describe it as false, possibly finds a justification for the insistence of its propagation by evoking something of the dimension of the trauma and the unexpected. After all, if psychoanalysis became present in the world, especially from the first two decades of the 20th century on, it was in 1912 that the world was shocked by the still most tragic collision between a ship and an iceberg, which resulted in the sinking of the Titanic. In this context, the iceberg metaphor, even initially presented four decades later by Jones (1963), continues to resonate as a kind of warning (especially to those who insisted on not acknowledging the analytical discovery of the unconscious), and also as an invitation to those that might have an interest in that which is not exactly visible, but that is there and can give rise to mistakes that, as in the case of the Titanic, can “cause”, as it is usually said, “traumas” and “tragedies”.
But, in Marques' poem (2009), there is no lack of interest in the iceberg that moves away. On the contrary, perhaps because it was written in our day, there is a fascination with the dazzling dimension of transparency (“the blind glare of the ice against the sun”) and, also, a kind of suspicion regarding what is said by the Other (“and everything they say is underneath”). This fascination with transparency and this suspicion regarding what is said by the Other are even seen as disturbing in our therapeutic applications of psychoanalysis in a world where the assumption of knowledge wavers, the word is not always able to show its power in the face of the non-existence of the Other and everything seems visible thanks to the way transparency takes shape in the world.
In the verses of Marques (2009), we see the shining tip of the iceberg moving away, we even consider, as it is said, that “there is still “underneath” an “everything” that moves away with it, but, at the same time, the growing distance still affects the one who sees the iceberg move away. Somehow, whoever looks at it becomes as dazzled as the icy transparency that goes away from him because, from the first verse, it is said that the separation that takes place there is the one of “our childhood”.
Unlike the young and disconcerted Lacan, when an also young fisherman's son provoked him by pointing out how the can of sardines that they saw shining in the sun in the middle of the Brittany Sea didn't look at him, Marques (2009), perhaps as much as Lacan ( 1964/1985, p. 94; 1964/1973, p. 88-89) who entrusts us with this fragment of his youth, shows that – even without looking at us – that from which we separate ourselves and which takes some distance from us it still affects us, fascinates us, gives us chills, chills our spines, it is part of “ours” and as foreign to us as what we call “our” bodies. In this context, considering what, at a distance and separated from us, looks at us, observes, fascinates and worries us. I hear Marques' poem (2009) dialogue with another, written a few decades earlier by Elisabeth Bishop (1946/1990, p. 22 ). ). Also taken by the iceberg (although referred to, in the title of this other poem, as “imaginary”), this North-American poet allows me to cut the following verses:
We’d rather have the iceberg than the ship, although it meant the end of travel [...]
O, solemn, floating field,
are you aware an iceberg takes repose
with you, and when it wakes may pasture on your snows?
[...] Its weight, the iceberg dares
upon a shifting stage and stands and stares.
Icebergs behoove the soul
(both being self-made from elements least visible)
to see them so: fleshed, fair, erected, indivisible.
Merging, then, the two poems, I would say that the iceberg-childhood that moves away never stops looking, attracting, challenging, embodying, for those who see it leaving, what is barely visible, but insists. Why tend toward giving it “preference” over the ship that, however changing, also departs or the journey that could continue? What is obscured by the clarity of this standing block of ice?
To the conception of the iceberg-psychic-apparatus falsely attributed to Freud, but which implies the traumatic encounter with what is unusual, looks and produces mistakes, these two poems allow me to confer, therefore, a corporeal dimension that is particularly important to this text. Therefore, they seemed to me to be a good introduction, also using what I have received in my clinic, to discuss the impasses of sexuation today and, above all, in their presentation in the analytical experience.
Neither men, nor women
The table of sexuation, completed and presented by Lacan (1972-73/1975, p. 73; 1972-73/1985, p. 105),[2] authorizes us to determine, especially in its first two lines, that, for a closed set, there will always be an exception. On the left side, male, second line, the closed group of “the castrated” (to every x Φx, that is, the phallic function that conveys castration is applied to everyone) supposes an exception that, in the first line, precedes it: there is an x that is not submitted to castration, to which the phallic function does not apply: . In turn, on the right side, feminine, first line, the existential negation of an x to which the negation of the phallic function applies () and, therefore, the negation of castration for any x ends up being another way of affirming the closed set of “the castrated”, because it proposes – through this existential negation of an x that is not submitted to Φx – that everyone is castrated and thus reaffirms, through negation, the existence of castration.
However, on the feminine side, what will effectively appear as unusual is another negation, located in the second line and which, focusing directly on the universal quantifier (the “for all”), introduces something completely unheard of in logic until then: this is “not-all x” (
), that is, the incidence of negation on the universal quantifier itself, which makes this negation different from both universal negation (there is no x that is not castrated) and particular negation (there is only one x that is not castrated).
Figure: Lacan (1972-73/1985, p.105).
Referring to a lecture given by Pierre-Gilles Guéguen on the table of sexuation, Wülfing (2013) presents us very clearly with this unusual, this unheard of, or, if we want to evoke the title of a writing by Lacan (1973/2001 ; 1973/2003), this “astonished” that appears on the feminine side of the sexuation table: in woman, “some part (of her) really says 'no' to the phallic function”, to castration, and that part is “her feminine jouissance” which makes her “singular... apprehensible only one by one”, enigmatic to herself, to female or male others. Thus, continues Wülfing (2013), when we say that “no woman is like another”, we are referring “to her unique jouissance” and not to what in her “says ‘yes’ to the phallic function”, to castration. In this context, especially when men proclaim that “women are all equal”, they take as their reference, in my opinion, what women are in male fantasy and that, in this fantasy aspect, they would say “yes” to the castration that is, if not theirs, certainly that of men. After all, the proclamation “women are all equal” silently carries a very masculine fear that equalizes them: “they want our castration”.
Wülfing (2013), also using a clarification made by Charraud (1998),[3] highlights that the “not-whole” concerning each woman makes her refuse to “recognize the exception in any other” and, therefore, women would not form a closed set of not-whole ones. In this sense, “a whole is only possible when a point of exception is recognized by everyone, and this never happens” Wülfing (2013). Hence, the aphorism, Woman does not exist (Lacan, 1972-73/1975).
This Lacanian aphorism of the non-existence of women is often counterbalanced, including by psychoanalysts, with the declaration that “women exist”. I tend to take this statement as a kind of caveat that, in fact, may be a (neurotic) way of dealing with the fear of castration: they provoke fury (especially in women) by saying that Woman does not exist, but, soon after, the existence of women is declared. The problem is that this statement can hide, in my opinion, the impossibility of having a closed set of not-wholes. Wülfing (2013), in turn, invites us to face in another way what can provoke the Lacanian aphorism of the non-existence of women and its corollary about the impossibility of a closed set of not-wholes: we cannot speak of the totality of women, nor is it absolutely certain that we can do so for one in particular – “we can only talk about female jouissance as what is different for each one”, including for one in relation to oneself and not just for one as different compared to another. Still, continues Wülfing (2013), talking about feminine jouissance also implies an impossibility because it is defined as “ that which cannot be said”. Therefore, the challenge that arises is: how to approach and talk about that which cannot be said.
In the contemporary world – and this is above all Wülfing's (2013) thesis that I am interested in highlighting – impossibility will not only refer to the existence of Woman, it starts to affect the existence of women and, therefore, the title of the text of this English psychoanalyst from the World Association of Psychoanalysis is: “No women in the 21st century”. This kind of expansion of non-existence with regard to women is directly related to the place that the significant phallus (Φ) has come to have in contemporary civilization: “something has changed in the 21st century” insofar as the phallus (Φ), this “term used by the other sex, namely by men, to designate everything does not work in society, in sex and in themselves, making women their symptom, is not performing that function very well now” because “there are fewer and fewer people concerned about sexual difference” (WÜLFING, 2013, s/p). This lack of concern with sexual difference, even when it does not appear so clearly due to our current defense of sexual diversity, means that men are also taken by non-existence: this set of castrated people, referenced to the phallus (Φ), organized from an exception, is shaken by the contemporary devaluation of this signifier and, therefore, Wülfing (2013, s/p) declares that the male sex “is also on its way out” and, in this sense, “no men in the 21st century".
We experience contempt for the phallus (Φ) because it is continually identified as an instrument of power and domination which, if not completely deprived, must be so for sexual diversity to take place among us, beyond all segregation of difference. The problem is that often is sexual difference today quickly assimilated into the heteronormativity to be fought, and sexual diversity, although this is not the purpose of the struggles and policies that proclaim it, ends up diluting what effectively makes the difference, and, in this context, also diversity itself.
Returning to the table of sexuation, but focusing now on what is found just below the Lacanian logical propositions, that is, the terms at the bottom, I allow myself to say that, at the beginning of this century, the loss of the power of the phallus as a signifier which would demarcate the difference between the sexes also compromises the encounters (and dis-encounters) between the sexes and their differences in jouissance.
Thus, on the feminine side, the double vector present in the sexuation table would tend to be reduced, today, to a single vector, the one that, starting from the non-existence of Woman marked by a bar over the capital letter of the defined feminine article (
) points to the signifier of the barred Other (
), that is, to what demarcates something regarding this non-existence. Hence, the loneliness that plagues those who find themselves on the feminine side of the sexuation table and which, nowadays, takes on even more intense contours. After all, the non-existence of Woman () would no longer be vectorized by what, on the male side, is the phallus (Φ) and, in this sense, it would only have to deal with what, on the female side, is also a signifier of the non-existence () or the reduction to the object (a) with which the subject ($) that appears on the masculine side seeks to resolve, always in vain, his division, his castration. Hence, also, this incessant drift (and no less solitary) that disturbs (not without, at times, a tone of defiance to “heteronormativity” or “machismo”) the sexual life of many young women who seek, depending on what shakes them in their “clubbing”, some type of guidance in the analytical experience.
For those who find themselves on the male side of the sexuation table, the vector continues to be the one that goes from the divided, castrated subject ($), to the object (a) with which we tend to reduce what concerns, especially for men, that which is presented to them as Other sex. However, on the male side, due to the loss of the power of the phallus as a signifier (Φ), whoever finds himself there would become increasingly devastated by what, according to Lacan (1975, p. 268), happens to the drug addict, that is, the breaking-up of the “marriage” between the body and the phallus. For those who find themselves on the male side of the sexuation table, it is proliferating, then, today, and not just in the context of what is diagnosed as “drug addiction”, a generalized toxic adherence to gadgets and everything that favors a kind of virtual autoeroticism. What has been called “rape culture”, or what takes other forms of this reduction – so characteristic of “machismo” – of the phallus (Φ) to the male sexual organ is also intensifying. On the other side of these open forms of enjoying without having to deal with the radical difference of the Other sex, it is not uncommon to find, in the analytical clinic, a strong inhibition on the part of some boys towards what would be presented as “masculine”.
The loss of the power of the phallus (Φ) as a signifier of jouissance implies, nowadays, what I would place, with Wülfing (2013), as a kind of proliferation of non-existence: there is no Other, nor Woman, but neither would there be women and men. What would exist, then, in this expanding desert of non-existence? Jouissance, without a doubt, continues to exist, but it tends to proliferate, always excessively and with almost no invention, in relationships with infinite objects made available on the market, accessible by a simple touch on the computer or cell phone screen, transposed into this endless writing that takes the form of “text messages”.[4] Like the “so-called feminine jouissance”, in its non-localized infinitization, jouissance spreads “like wildfire” (WÜLFING, 2013, s/p) consuming the bodies.
Thus, “less and less” are we “embarrassed by the lack of jouissance in our lives” (WÜLFING, 2013, s/p), but this expanded and infinite presence of jouissance invades the hole that runs through human sexuality. There is this hole because such sexuality does not follow a natural or pre-established program, nor is there a parameter capable of determining any proportion in relations between the sexes. On the feminine side of the sexuation table, it presents itself as the non-existence of Woman () and is demarcated by the signifier of the non-existence of the Other () or, from another perspective, by the object a as that which escapes the symbolization of jouissance by language. On the masculine side of the sexuation table, such a hole still has some place in the division that crosses the subject ($), but it is much more precisely detectable in the phallus (Φ) because it is both that which is destined to “give substance to jouissance” (LACAN, 1960/1966, p. 822; 1960/1998, p. 836) and presents itself as a living, unmortified mark of "enjoyment the jouissance that is impossible to negativize” (MILLER, 2011, p. 233-303), and that which designates a “fallacy” (LACAN, 1975-76/2007, p. 101-114) that, as we will see later, testifies to the real of the non-existence of any proportion between the sexes.
According to Wülfing (2013), this hole that, in its different forms, I tried to locate on the two different sides of the sexuation table, leads us to interpret and invent ways of approaching or avoiding the Other sex, but always making us confront the impasses that permeate sexual bodies. Therefore, if the expanded and infinite presence of jouissance in the contemporary world insists on suturing it, this capacity for interpretation and invention may be strongly compromised, as we find in the inhibitions and displays that affect the different ways of living sexuality today.
This infinite proliferation of jouissance and its insistence on suturing the hole that, in its different dimensions, affects both sides of the sexuation table means that, according to Wülfing (2013), faced with the non-existence of Woman, women and men, as well as in response to the loss of the power of the phallus as a signifier, there come to be only girls and boys, that is, those who are not yet sexualized as women or men. After all, current civilization, even if it is still crossed by waves of conservatism, increasingly consolidates a sexual liberation that – by aiming to get rid of the way in which words take over bodies, by not conceiving sexual difference as a difference between modes of jouissance and reducing it to genital difference or the performance of different ways of experiencing sex – is much more a “way of getting rid of sex” (WÜLFING, 2013, s/p), because it tends to dilute what makes a hole in the diverse experiences of sexual bodies.
In a world where sexual liberation becomes more and more paradoxically the way to free oneself from what is real in sexualized bodies, I find that the analytical experience can often be an opportunity, especially with regard to young people, to make what Miller (2016, p. 22-23) highlighted from a writing by Lacan (1958/1998a) effectivet, namely, an “immixture” of sexuation with regard to the differences in the modes of jouissance of sexualized bodies.
Lacanian legacy for the 21st century
In the first lesson of Seminar 23, Lacan (1975-76/2007, p. 16), presents the phallus as “the conjunction” between “this parasite” – a term used to designate what he calls, quite popularly, “the little piece of dick in question” and “the function of speech”. This conception of the phallus as a parasite, although without the literal use of this term, was already present in some way when, many years earlier, reading the Freudian clinical case of “little Hans”, Lacan (1956-57/1995, p. 231) highlights the moment when, for this boy, his “penis begins to become something completely real”, “it starts to move” and the child, disturbed by what is happening in his body, “starts to masturbate ”. Thus, the parasitism of the phallus has to do, on the one hand, with this demand for jouissance that assaults the body. But, on the other hand, when, in the first lesson of Seminar 23, the organ that moves due to what is imposed as jouissance on the body, is also explicitly associated with speech, it seems important to remember that, later on, in the sixth lesson of this same Seminar, Lacan (1975-76/2007, p. 92) designates speech precisely as “a parasite... an excretion... the form of cancer by which the human being is afflicted”. Therefore, the combination of the male genital organ with speech elevates the parasitism of the phallus to a double power.
As I see it, even in our world, where there is a growing devaluation of the phallus, its parasitic dimension continues to affect, even in an insidious way, the sexuation of bodies, as I tried to demonstrate here. Lacanian-oriented psychoanalysis – as it is interested in the junctions and disjunctions between speech and body – offers us privileged ways to respond to this parasitism that persists even in the contemporary devaluation of the phallus because this does not occur without bodies, nor without speech.
If the current world discredits the phallus, I consider it important to point out that, for Lacanian-oriented psychoanalysis, it is not about necessarily giving it some credit and becoming, as analysts, a kind of guarantee for the validity of the phallus today. It is about taking literally and really seriously the fallacy that, not always in the best way, this contemporary discredit of the phallus attributes to it. After all, if such discredit proclaims that the phallus is a fallacy that would hide the diversity of sexuality by restricting it to “heteronormativity”, it is a matter of confronting, in this proclamation, what is fallacious about it, insofar as it tends to reduce the phallus (and always in a polarized way) either to the genital organ or to a symbol, without taking into account the conjunction between body and speech of this “parasite” that is the phallus.
The seventh lesson of Seminar 23 is doubly timely for us to verify what is really at stake in the phallus fallacy. Firstly, even making use of homophonic resonances and the production of a kind of oxymoron, Lacan (1975-76/2007, p. 107, 109 and 114) will place the phallus within the scope of “a fallacy” related to the real, to appearance and to evidence. In French, as I was able to understand in one of Laurent's classes (2014-2015) at the seminar Parler lalangue du corps[5] and, subsequently, when consulting the prestigious dictionary Le grand Robert de la langue française, the noun used by Lacan – fallace (“fallacy”) – is a strange element: what we actually find, etymologically dated to 1460 and 1552, are, respectively, his adjective and adverbial forms – “fallacious” (fallacieux), “fallacious” (fallacieuse), “fallaciously” (fallacieusement). Both these forms and the noun fallace used by Lacan (1975-76/2007, p. 107 and 108), insofar as they point to what is deceptive, illusory, falsifying, lying, can even resonate with the discredit conferred today to the phallus, but – taking a second, very different aspect of this contemporary devaluation – Lacan (1975-76/2007, p. 107 and 114) presents the fallacy as “what testifies to the real” and the phallus as “the only real that verifies whatever it is... insofar as it is the support of the signifying function”.
Returning to the considerations presented here on the table of sexuation, I would say that, when the fallacy of the phallus is sustained only in the context of its devaluation as a “symbol of power” that “heteronormatizes” the diversity of sexualized bodies, this diversity will tend to freeze these bodies in a kind of eternal childhood transforming them into sex toys as a way of avoiding any confrontation with the hole of the non-existence of sexual relation, with the enigmas that the diverse experience of jouissance and the appeal to speech make emerge in the bodies. However, if the fallacy of the phallus is approached as what bears witness to the real, it will allow us to listen to it and make it be listened to in this “noise”, this “chatter”, this “blahblah” of contemporary “sexuation” or, on the contrary, also according to the clinical situations we analyse, in this strong inhibition that takes over bodies today, in this kind of yearning and, why not say, anguish related to the way in which today the generalization of sex toys seeks, even if in vain, to elude the hole or, to use Lacan's term, the “fallacies” that occur not only when bodies mismatch, but above all when they, from adolescence, are impelled to find one another.
In the eighth lesson of Seminar 23, Lacan (1975-76/2007) will unfold, as Miller already indicates in the subtitles, “the phallic function, between fantasy and phonation”, giving us new elements to approach the parasitism of the phallus in its conjugation of a part of the body taken by jouissance with the no less jouissant dimension of speech, that is, in the conjugation of what fantasy cuts out in bodies and what resonates phonetically in what is said. Undoubtedly, there would still be much to develop on these formulations of Lacan on the phallus and sexuation, as well as to do archeology on them, for example, in Seminar 4, in the writing on the significance of the phallus, in the location of the latter as one of the forms of object a in Seminar 10 and in the speech-erection-phallus relationship in Seminar 19.[6] For now, I will stick to the following: these formulations, together with those worked on here and extracted from Seminars 20 and 23, are part of what Lacan bequeathed to us to face, with analytical experience, the impasses of sexuation in the 21st century. In a world taken by the devaluation of the phallus, it is a matter of assuming, more and more, that it is not purely the parasite, “the little piece of dick”, but the conjunction of that which stands out from the body, embodies this other parasite that it is speech and testifies, as a fallacy, to the real that pulses in sexual bodies. Sexual difference, then, can be approached, in the analytical experience, thanks to these new ways of using what, since the Rome speech, Lacan (1953/1966) called “the powers of speech”.
In this sense, letting childhood drift away like an iceberg is not the result of maturation, as many post-Freudians intended and, even today, as many psych-professionals proclaim. Being fascinated by this icy transparency and freezing in it has become common nowadays, but it is not a way out either, because the bodies experience childhood inexorably moving away as time passes and interferes with each person's modes of jouissance. “Imaginary”, as Bishop (1946/1990) qualifies it, separated from us, as Marques (2009) makes us see it, or even, as we also find in many cases that we analyse, as the object of a deadly “attachment”, this iceberg-childhood could, with analytical experience, move to what Lacan (1971/2009, p. 109-110 and 113-114) called “coast”, where – due to the fallacious conjunction between body and speech – knowledge and jouissance could be experienced as different elements that, nevertheless, touch and affect each other, especially when we are willing to make this parasitism talk and listen to it, which affects the living bodies.
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MILLER, J.-A. Em direção à adolescência. Opção Lacaniana, n. 72, p. 20-29, 2015/2016.
SOUTO, S. Uma forma moderna de viver a não-relação sexual: qual lugar para o amor. #Followme. Boletim eletrônico do XXI Encontro Brasileiro do Campo Freudiano, n. 7, 2016. Disponível em: http://www.encontrobrasileiro2016.org/uma-forma- moderna. Acesso em: 20 fev. 2024.
WÜLFING, N. No women in the 21st century. In: LCexpress, v. 2, n. 6, 2013. Disponível em:http://static1.squarespace.com/static/53080463e4b0e23db627855b/t/5329e0fae4b0137f6ac3a71c/1395253498254/lcexpress-6-05-28-2013.pdf. Acesso em: 20 fev. 2024.
Notas
[1] This text was originally published in the online Bulletin Followme, n. 13, 2016, as a preparatory texto to the 21st Brazilian Encounter of the Freudian Field.
[2] We can consider that the elaboration od the sexuation table starts with Seminar 18 (LACAN, 1971/2009), goes on throughout Seminar 19 (LACAN, 1971-72/2012) and is concluded in Seminar 20 (LACAN, 1972-73/1985).
[3] In her text, Wülfing (2013) quote the translation into English of Charraud’s text (1998) about Cantor and Lacan, but presents the French journal of the original article with tthe worng number. In the References this article is cited with the correct number.
[4] A thought-provoking analysis of this endless writing to which young people particularly dedicate themselves today was carried out by Souto (2016).
[5] It is possible to listen to the classes of this seminar by Laurent (2014-2015) through Radio Lacan (available at: http://www.radiolacan.com/es/topic/583). I also highlight that this course was later resumed in the form of a book, but the reference to the strangenes of the noun fallace (fallacy) in the French language does not appear again in this written publication (Laurent, 2016).
[6] See in the references, Lacan (1956-57/1995, 1958/1998b, 1962-63/2005 e 1971-72/2012).
English version by Ana Helena Souza
